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INSTITUTE OF 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
In this essay we wish to present some of the possibilities 
for doing systematic quantitative research in the field of 
African public administration- and to review .some -of the 
methodological problems involved. We are convinced that 
quantification is desirable even in the early stages of a 
new field of inquiry and that the benefits in the use of 
quantitative methods in the area of African public administra-
tion are likely to be. especially-great. 
I . 
Very little quantitative work has been done anywhere in 
Africa in the field, of public administration. -The major 
published work i-s Morroe Berger's Bureaucracy and .oociet:/- in 
Modern Egypt V. S.ubramaniam has underway -a study of the 
social background of Zambian higher civil servants." Goran 
Ilyden has a book in draft on government involvement in the 
co-operative movement in Kenya." Several pieces of research 
have been completed or are in progress on agricultural extension 
organizations,4 There may be a few other studies of which 
we are not aware. But the total amount of quantitative work 
is limited, and most areas of inquiry have received no attention. 
Many students of African public administration would argue 
that the poverty of our current knowledge makes quantification 
undesirable at this stage. They, hold that our greatest 
immediate need is a collection, of studies which provides an 
overview of the shape of our subject. A quantitatively 
detailed description of one aspect of public administration 
may preclude our gaining adequate insight into the dynamics 
and the unexpected features of the-whole. Associated with 
this argument would be one which pointed out that we can 
measure only phenomena which we already know are present. Too 
early quantification could thus restrict us to our current, 
as yet inadequate and largely Western, state .of insight. 
The case against "premature" quantification is a powerful 
one. We believe,, however, that there are many overriding 
arguments on the quantitative side. First, unless we make 
some effort in the direction of measurement, our intuitions 
are likely to pass into the literature as if they were facts 
and our errors will become reified in other scholars' analyses. 
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The long list of well-sounding academic insights that failed 
to meet the hard test of empirical verification in the American 
quantitative revolution should caution us that the danger of 
error is real. One of us is currently completing a study of 
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the Kenya Government agricultural extension organization. 
An orthodoxy of the Ministry of Agriculture hierarchy is that 
the untrained, less-informed extension workers avoid the "better 
farmers ,• beca'use these agents have, little to teach them. The 
assumption is emminently reasonable, leading1 o;ne to believe, 
that the constituency-of the untrained workers is the less 
advanced farmers. But empirical study of the characteristics 
of farmers whom extension workers actually visit showed :that 
if anything the untrained, less-informed extension agents may 
be more, not less, likely to concentrate their attentions on 
the better farmers. Studies of welfare workers in the United 6 
States reveal a similar pattern" and once one knows the facts 
it is not too difficult to go on and explain them. The point, 
however, is (hat a false visitation pattern was firmly believed 
to be true, and a scholar who did not apply methods allowing 
for the falsification of the'"conventional wisdom" would 
perhaps have continued to promote the incorrect assumption. 
Second, insensitivity to unexpected or non-v/estern variables 
is by no means inevitable in quantitative research.. We agree. , 
that there is a danger that a hurried researcher, especially 
the expatriate one, will do a survey on a topic, measuring 
variables that are important in 'western theory and missing 
ones that are critical in the local environment. But the cure 
for this failing is careful exploratory research in the area 
one intends to study and a continuing sensitivity to the 
culturally unique features of the society in which one is 
working.' Quantitative methods have not kept Goran Hyden from 
examining the impact of African social structures on the Kenyan 7 
co-operative movement.' Further, in: his current study of .-•.-j 
managerial ideologies he is using survey research as a tool 
to establish the correctness of his ecological approach to 
the field of African administration.0 The strongest case 
made anywhere in the literature for the cultural uniqueness 
of an administrative system is Michel Crozier's. The Bureaucratic 9 " 
Phenomenon.y This study was grounded in quantitative: research 
and in fact is facilitated in making comparisons with other 
administrative cultures because the other studies had been 
carried out in a. comparable rigorous framework. One of the 
great advantages of quantitative research is that, it makes 
comparisons between widely separated administrative systems 
both easier and more reliable. In the study of the Kenyan 
agricultural extension organization to which, we referred 
earlier, it is possible to make precise comparisons.with 
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similar Panzanian and Nigerian studies because of their all 
having been based on quantitative techniques. 
Finally, the field of administrative' organization is very 
rich in its availability of both theories for rigorous testing-
and western studies 'for careful comparison. Organization 
theorists such as March .and Simon, sociologists such as Blau 
and Scott,' -and students of small groups such as Theodore Caplow 
present a vast number of propositions that can bo adapted and 
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tested in Africa. The pay-offs to carefully conceived 
quantitative work are likely to be particularly great here, 
as the precision of the Western material enables one to' become 
immediately involved in cross-cultural comparisons." Even 
within our still poor discipline of comparative' public adminis- " 
tration the ecologically based ideas of Fred JRig'gs need, as 
Warren Ilchman has argued, to be carefully tested before'' they 11 are accepted and taught. 
II 
Most of the Western studies of administrative organization 
have treated differences in productivity as the major factor 
to be explained. T'-ere are many good reasons for carrying 
this focus on productivity Into the study of African public 
administration. One reason Is that our primary interest in 
government organizations is in what they produce for the system. 
By .and large our concern with issues such as political control 
of government bureaucracies, corruption and patterns of recruit-
ment into the civil service is based on the presumed effect of 
these factors upon the creation and distribution of public 
benefits. Certainly the greatest number of Fred Riggs' prop-
ositions ultimately relate to the productivity of the civil 
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service. 
Productivity studies are 'also considered desirable by 
our research subjects, the civil servants, and a focus on 
them thus may increase one's usefulness to the country in 
which one is working and at the same time ease one's problems 
of access and finance. Kenyan ministries, "at least, have been 
employing foreign management consultants. A large number of 
external aid agencies are Interested in evaluations of the 
productivity 'of pro'jects they have financed and can sometimes 
be generous in funding such research. Money "aid interest thus 
exist which can be turned to research and practical advantage 
by the experienced local scholar. Governments tend to be 
sceptical of the value of a' student's research until he has 
proved his expertise through an accomplished study. After 
that actual requests for research are likely to be forthcoming. 
The local.academic thus, generally needs to invest in one well-
conceived research project "before he . can . expect non-academic 
assistance with funding. -Of course, the student should remain 
careful about.the.commitments he undertakes in such financing 
and be sure that he is not .being exploited for legitimating 
purposes, thus denying his academic interests. 
Access is easier.than funding, though it is not without 
its problems. In a paper on agricultural extension Beverly 
Brock has expressed great scepticism that the African civil ' 1 3 
servant will allow, his productivity to be studied. She 
feels that the prospect of his inefficiency being revealed 
is too threatening to the civil servant.. Our experience has 
been that this pessimistic prediction -greatly underestimates 
the genuine interest of African civil servants in the produc-
tivity of their organizations. Few civil servants will wel- . 
come research which threatens to expose their own inadequacies, 
but they are frequently quite interested in studies that will 
analyse the shortcomings of their own subordinates and/or 
enable them to communicate their own operational problems to 
their superiors. As long as the researcher offers enough of 
these attractions to the civil servant, he is.likely to.get 
cooperation despite: the presence in his research design of some 
threatening questions. Of. course great tact and a.clear 
commitment to protect the anonimity.of one's. respondents .are 
necessary, but- the,pay-offs in cooperation can be very great.- ., 
In such a situation one of us was able, to use Government for 
communication and authority channels/arranging interviews and 
to -conduct them during, working hours. More .importantly, in 
the framework of.a productivity study we, were able to investigate 
otherwise forbidden topics, such as the tribal and status 14-determinants of the. social structure of the cx.vil service. 
In expressing our interest in productivity studies we 
would like to emphasize that we believe these should he broadly 
conceived and should include consideration not only of how 
much benefit is produced but also of who gets it. Develop-
ment studies have tended to be dominated by fairly narrow 
consideration of economic growth or productivity. There is 
great need for sensitivity to non-economic benefits and to 
the patterns of distribution of benefits. Such interests are 
fitted in fairly easily.when responding to demands for more-
traditionally conceived productivity research. Doing so gives 
us the. opportunity both to utilize the legitimacy, created by 
the technical utility.of the old.organization and management 
studies and to respond to. the need for information on the. 
determinants of, distribution patterns. 
c 
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We can illustrate the possibilities of productivity 
research by considering two hypothetical agricultural marketing 
boards. Such parastatal organizations are quite common in 
Africa. They usually are involved in'the purchase, transporta-
tion, final processing,:and overseas sale of a particular 
crop and are customarily characterized- by a politically 
appointed board, an administrative cadre, and a number of 
semi-skilled employees. To first consider the efficiency • ; 
criterion of productivity, we can easily imagine a situation' 
in which one marketing board is found to have a proportionately 
much more expensive administrative apparatus than the other's. 
In other words, after we have subtracted the costs of processing 
(which are not lively to be comparable, as different crops 
have different processing technologies), the overhead of one 
marketing board represents a greater percentage of its gross 
sales than does that of the other. . A number of interesting 
hypotheses might be advanced to account for the observed 
difference in performance. The workers dn the more productive 
board are more committed" to the welfare of the farmers they 
serve while those in the other see their work only as a job. 
There is a much greater degree of harmony and comraderie among 
the employees of the efficient board. The less productive 
board is characterized by a highly differentiated task structure, 
which has proved inflexible, while the other has a less special-
ized set of roles and has been adaptable in the.face of new 
marketing conditions. The growth rate of the less productive 
marketing board has been extremely rapid and thus disruptive 
to its efficiency whereas the more efficient board has enjoyed 
a steady and manageable rate of growth. The less efficient 
board is operating with a crop of which there is an interna-
tional surplus but for which there is. not yet a world quota 
system. Such a quota agreement is expected in the next'few' 
years, and the board is trying to expand its'country's share 
of the international market in that .crop so a-s to improve its 
future bargaining position. This board is -therefore aiming 
for quantity and- is willing to- sacrifice efficiency in the' 
short term, whereas the other ong- already has a quota and' is 
able to concentrate., on efficiency, under stable conditions. 
And so one might go on. 
Studying differences in the impact on income distribution 
of two boards wbuld involve a. different set of hypotheses. 
We might find that one board provides its services more 
effectively, or at lower cost, to small farmers while the 
other works to the relative benefit of plantation growers. 
It might be that one of the boards draws its semi-skilled 
employees from the families of the small farmers and that the 
consequent identification of the employees with this group 
leads to better services for them. Other hypotheses would 
be ones such as the following': workers in the plantation 
oriented board find that shortcomings in services arc- much more 
visible when they are experienced by large growers, who move 
in the same social circles as their superiors, and the workers 
consequently feel under much greater pressure to perform well 
for these clients. Plantation owners, have devised a stable 
majority coalition to control one board.whereas alliances are 
shifting' on the other board and leave the large growers in 
a weaker position. One board has taken a policy decision to 
favour plantations, believing that their efficiency will lead 
to a more rapid growth in national income. The other favours 
small growers as a way of redistributing wealth. Or, finally, 
the small growers for one crop are important politically to 
the group governing the country while those from the other 
largely support the:opposition. ,The Government thus applies 
more pressure on one board to favour small holder interests 
than it does on the other. 
Considering the efficiency .and the. distributional policies 
of the§e two marketing boards illustrates the variety of 
hypotheses which are often advanced to account for differential 
productivity and differential .consequences', for the citizens. 
Indeed, in each case there are:five separate hypotheses and 
in-each case there are five research strategies thereby indicated. 
A useful way in which to review potentials and problems'in 
quantitative research on administrative productivity is to 
consider each of these hypotheses, and particularly to ask 
about conditions appropriate'(and therefore inappropriate) 
for introducing survey research techniques. 
A brief overview of our intent is. in order. In the hypoth-
eses attempting to account for the comparative efficiency of 
the two marketing boards as well as the hypotheses relevant -
to the different distributions of benefits there is one ' 
important commonality. In each instance the marketing board 
along with its administrative cadre .'and workers is the unit of 
analysis. That is, it is a group and not an individual which 
the researcher sets out to explain. 
The illustrative hypotheses direct attention to what are 
often called unit or group properties, that is, to attributes 
which describe or otherwise characterize1 a collectivity rather 
than an individual. These, unit properties-have been named as 
follows: Distributional, Relational, Structural, Integral, 
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and Contextual. v We will apply this, nomenclature here in order1 
to emphasize the benefits of quantitative-, research which has 
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the administrative agency or bureau as the unit of analysis. 
Let us consider the hypotheses in sequence. 
'1. a) A marketing board is more efficient if its workers 
and staff are committed to the welfare of the farmers 
they serve. 
b) A marketing board is more likely to equitably allocate 
rather than concentrate its benefits if its workers 
are recruited from the families of peasant farmers. 
Both hypotheses involve research about the distribution of 
certain traits within the administrative agency. Is there 
more commitment among the workers of one marketing board than 
among the workers of the other? Is the composition of one 
agency weighted more heavily toward the peasant farmers than 
the composition of the other? Social class composition or the 
distribution c£ an attitudinal factor such as "commitment" are • 
both characteristics of the administrative agency itself, in 
the present case of the marketing boards. 
What are called "distributional properties" of a group 
are obtained by performing a mathematical operation on some 
attribute of its members.. This is so common in administrative 
research that we often fail to recognize that a statement or 
proposition is actually about the group rather than the 
individual. One author writes about Kenya that "five short 
months after independence, six of the seven civil secretary 
(provincial commissioner) posts were held by Africans. 
Here ' a proportion is being used to describe the process of 
Africanization and, by comparing it to a previous proportion, 
to show the pace of the Africanization program. Another author 
reports, also about Kenya, that "As late as 1968 the average 
age of all permanent secretaries was .only 39, and of provincial 
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commissioners 40.." ' Here a measure of central tendency, a 
mean or a median,is'used to characterize a part of the civil 
service, a characterization subsequently applied in analysis 
about the frustrations (also a distributive property) of 
younger recruits into the service. 
The members of any group are individually characterized 
by age, years of training, level of education, length of 
service, race., and so forth. Whenever the group is described 
with reference to such demographic characteristics of its 
members, we say that .a distributional property has been 
identified. And as our illustrative hypotheses made clear, 
groups can be described with reference to the attitudinal 
traits of members. It is not uncommon to encounter sentences 
such as the following: "there was widespread resentment by 
civil servants against many ministers for their inadequate 
defense of the service" or "this reverence for regulations 
creates in some civil servants a tendency to regard themselves 
I < merely is instruments for putting the regulations into effect". 
Terms such as "resentment" or "reverance" identify traits of 
individual administrators, "but terms such as "widespread" or 
"some" indicate that these traits are distributed in such a 
manner as to affect the performance of the civil service itself. 
The advantages of survey techniques are readily apparent 
to the scholar whose hypotheses lead him to consider the dis-
tributional properties of the administrative agencies he is 
studying. Surveys allow him to identify the traits of each 
member of the agency (or a large enough sample to characterize 
the agency) so that, at the analysis stage, he can calculate 
proportions, measures of central tendency, or measures of 
dispersion. These measures in turn are used as unit or group 
properties which allow for testing propositions about the e 
comparative efficiency or the distributional policies of, say, 
marketing boards. 
In the examples given, a survey could be conducted to see 
if the distribution of "commitment to the well-being of the 
farmers" vs. "this is just a job" did differentiate the two 
marketing boards. This same survey would also permit comparing 
the two boards as regards the class origins of their, workers, 
and thus lead to a test of the hypothesis about the redistribu-
tion of wealth. 
2. a) The efficiency of a marketing board is influenced by 
the extent of harmony and comraderie among its 
employees, with more harmonious relations bringing 
about more efficient operations, 
b) The large'farmers and plantation owners will receive 
a disproportionate share of the benefits if they: 
maintain close social relationships with board executiv 
Both hypotheses involve research about the relationships which 
characterize the respective marketing boards, one set of 
relationships referring to those which hold within the admin-
istrative agencies and the other referring to those which hold 
between the agency, or an important unit of it, and the client, 
when, for instance, we say that there is more harmony among 
the employees of one board and greater tension among the 
employees of the other, we are characterizing administrative 
groups in terms of their relational properties. And again 
when we say that the executives and (some of) the clients are 
personal friends and perhaps belong to the same social'circles, 
we are describing relational properties. 
From the point of view of research strategy it is necessary 
to realize that relational properties cannot be investigated 
by concentrating on the isolated individual. .Harmony, tension, 
friendship patterns, and so forth are not attributes of an 
individual, but rather are attributes of the interaction between 
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or among individuals. It frequently is necessary to understand 
a pattern of relationships which hold within an administrative 
agency if the investigator is to make sense of different rates : 
of productivity or different distributional policies. 
Consider the following propositions: "Excessive reliance 
upon formal authority of the office may lead to cold, rigid 
relationships which impede task accomplishment. On the other 
hand, the highly personal leader may become too closely 
involved in the work of his subordinates, thereby losing his 
ability for critical judgment and effective command in situations 
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which require these." y Here it is the relationships which 
characterize interactions between officials at different status 
levels which ire thought to account for "task accomplishment" 
or "effective command." The important fact to note is that 
phenomena such as "cold, rigid relationships" vs. "personal... 
involved" ones are characteristics of different administrative 
units. That is, there are prevailing patterns of relationships 
in any group, and these prevailing patterns do have a bearing 
on performance. 
It is equally evident that different types of relationships 
characterize- the interaction between an agency and its clients 
(or superiors), and that these relationships can' have a bearing 
on such significant issues as performance' or favoritism. One 
student of the impact of foreign aid in developing countries 
notes that "Harmony can obtain between an aid agency and the 
local government, but tensions can also arise in such relation-:. ; - 20 ships and in those which obtain among doner agencies," 
and then goes on to suggest that relationships of harmony or 
tension Can have considerable consequences for the amount and 
utilization of foreign aid. In our illustrative hypothesis, 
friendship patterns between the plantation owners and'the 
high status board executives are considered relevant to how the 
board allocates the funds and other benefits under its control. 
1 Survey techniques are quite clearly relevant to identify-
ing relational properties, and thus to testing hypotheses 
which make assumptions about the relations which hold within 
or between administrative agencies. One widely used technique 
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is known as "sociometric research". The members of a group 
are asked to name: their friends-,'whom they go to for advice, 
who they most respect,' how often' and in what circumstances they 
see fellow workers-,: who they share information with, and so 
forth. If the members of a group are asked these questions 
it is Comparatively easy to identify the relational properties 
(and also, as we shall see below, structural properties). 
The techniques 'of sociometric research are too complicated 
for detailed re vie w here, but it should be noted that sociometry 
can be a valuable way in which to apply survey methods to the 
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study of administrative agencies. 
The important distinction between distributive and relational 
properties of groups is that the former are reducible to the 
traits of individuals whereas the latter are minimally 
reducible to interactions between at least two (.and often 
many more) members ,of the group. The important commonality 
between the two properties is that they are .attributes of 
groups and they,can be investigated by the intelligent 
application of survey methodologies. 
3. a) Marketing boards vary in their effectiveness because 
the relatively small amount of role specialization 
in one•agency allows for flexible adjustment to 
changing market conditions, whereas the very great 
extent of functional differentiation in the other 
agency impedes flexibility, 
b)-A faction.representing the interests of plantation 
owners controls the decision-process of the one board 
whereas the other board is characterized by changing 
alignments on each individual issue which calls for 
• a decision. 
These hypotheses identify what are commonly called structural 
properties of groups. Functional differentiation, for example, 
refers to the extent of. task specialization in the organization, 
or the degree to which different roles involve different types 
of duties. The larger the. ratio of functionally .distinct 
roles to the. total number of organizational roles, the more 
functionally differentiated ..the organization is. An organization 
with a very large amount of role specialization is likely 
to effectively discourage its members from responding to new 
tasks outside of their closely defined roles. A board with 
less functional differentiation is therefore likely to enjoy 
greater adaptive capacity. 
The second hypothesis also identifies a structure; in 
this case it is the decision-structure of a board of directors. 
Decision-structures are common to all groups which regularly 
take votes or otherwise come to decisions about policy issues. 
In some other research with which one of the authors has been 22 
involved, 82 local governing councils .were, studied.^" It was 
possible to classify these councils in terms of three types of 
decision-structures: unipolar councils are those in .which 
unanimous voting on most issues was prevalent, a situation 
often brought about by the presence of a strong leader; 
nonpolar councils are those in. which split voting, is common . 
but no permanent alliances are formed, each issue leads to 
different voting blocs in favor and in opposition; bipolar 
councils are those in which the members are more or less 
permanently clustered into two factions, a majority and a 
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minority faction, much as is true of Parliaments when party- -
affiliation determines voting patterns. In the illustrative 
hypothesis suggested above, the board with .a "nonpolar" 
decision-structure practices a more, quitable distribution 
policy because each, issue is decided in terms of arguments and 
pressures' brought to bear by different types of constituencies. 
The second board more nearly resembles the "bipolar" decision-
structure in that a permanent majority-faction can continually 
outvote the remainder of the members, and since in our hypothet-
ical case this faction favors the large growers, benefits are 
disproportionately directed to them. 
The analysis of structural properties is indispensable 
in the study of administration. Indeed, terms such as 
hierarchy, status, role, differentiation, and organization.are . 
used In definitions of bureaucracies and bureaucratic processes. 
All of these terms point toward the structure of the civil 
service or any agency in it. Perhaps most familiar ;to students 
of administration is the "authority structure" by which is 
commonly meant the arrangements which determine which role-
occupants issue what sorts of commands and which role-occupants 
obey what sorts of commands. ..lien we read that authority is 
concentrated or dispersed, is integrated or segmented, is 
secure or fragile, we recognize that a structural property 
is being described. 
Structures.are interesting to us because they define the 
flow.of transactions and interactions in a bureaucracy. When, 
for instance, the status structure is described the investiga-
tor knows something about patterns of deference relationships, 
when the communication structure is described the investigator 
knows something about- patterns of information flow. When the 
authority structure is described the investigator knows, some-
thing about patterns of directives and compliances.. 
The structural properties of a group can be more or less 
lasting. The most permanent features of the group., especially 
of -agencies such as marketing boards and other administrative 
units, are. usually identified in its organizational chart, 
which is actually a representation of certain structural 
properties of the group. The lines and boxes so familiar t.o . 
the reader of organizational charts simply identify the pre-
scribed authority ..or- communication relationships expected t.o 
hold among;the various roles of the organization. The chart 
itself of course,is not a structural property of the group, 
but it does permit us to identify such structures as, for 
instance, the span ,of control which characterizes the administra-
tive unit. 
Not all•structures have been formalized and thus pictured 
in organization charts. Certainly one would never find 
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decision-structures outlined in the handbook' of procedures. 
Yet decision-structures are very real and often very permanent 
properties of groups which continually must choose among 
policy alternatives. And to know that 'a marketing board,-
for instance, has majority and minority voting'blocs is to 
know something of more than passing interest about how it 
conducts its business. 
There are also"what we frequently term "informal structures" 
which refer to the patterned interactions which are not sanctioned 
in official procedures hut which nevertheless characterize 
most groups. This is what is meant by such comments-as "the 
real way to get something accomplished'around here is to work 
through the administrative secretary" or "important messages 
come directly from the field -and usually by-pass the provincial 
headquarters." These comments identify leadership structures 
or communication structures which are often more' critical to 
the functioning of the administrative apparatus than are the 
formalized structures of authority or communication. 
Although group structures tell us a great deal about;how 
people in groups relate with each other, it is important to . 
distinguish between relational and structural properties. 
Though this distinction is not always easy-to make, one 
difference is that whereas relational properties can be 
reduced to dyads (that is, to pairs of individuals) structural 
properties cannot be similarly reduced. That is, it can be 
said of a group that it is generally harmonious without every 
member necessarily being cooperative and friendly with every 
other member. But it c'annot be said of a'group' that its 
authority structure is pyramidical without making an assumption 
about the standing of every mfember (role-occupant) as regards 
the exercise of authority. Another way in which to consider . 
the difference between relational and structural properties, 
is to think in terms of: role-socialization-. -When'a new recruit 
joins an agency he often is instructed, formally or informally, 
in the duties and privileges associated with his role as well 
as the duties and privileges associated with other roles in 
the organization. In effect he is being introduced to the 
structure of the' group, or at least to some part's of it. 
Relations, in contrast, are not "taught" the new recruit, 
though due note may be made that a spirit of cooperation and 
harmony are expected of employees. The'type of relationships 
suggested by the term "relational properties" are those which 
emerge from the exchanges taking place between pairs of 
individuals. Structural properties, in contrast, suggest 
that certain forms of interaction are imposed on the group 
by virtue of the expectations and obligations'associated'with 
its roles. - ' 
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Structural properties can be identified in a variety of 
ways, including simply looking at the organizational chart or 
asking a well-placed informant to describe the communication 
net work or the status system or the authority roles. -But 
survey techniques are not without usefulness even in studying 
structural properties. Thus, for instance, if no formal 
records are kept of voting alignments in a committee or council 
or board, it ma;/ be necessary to ask people with whom they 
regularly side if the research design calls for identification 
of factions. Or perhaps the investigation cannot easily 
proceed unless the "informal" Structures of a group are 
identified. Again survey techniques are relevant, as when the 
members of an agency are asked to describe the flow of 
information in the group. It may not be possible to decide 
whether the actual communication structure is a fork (everyone 
sending messages to a central position which then communicates 
them to superiors) or a wheel (everyone communicates with every-
one else), for instance, without asking persons about the 
number of messages the7f send and receive. 
Sociometric analysis can be used to describe structural 
as well as relational properties. For instance, many of the 
administrative unibs in which we are interested are•made up 
of "equals" in that no one has formal authority over anyone 
else. At best, many committees, boards, councils, and other 
groups have a nominal chairman who convenes meetings but who 
has no special authority over other members. Yet we know • 
that groups nearly always evolve 'some type of leadership 
structure. Sociometric techniques are valuable in describing 
the leadership structure of a "committee of equals." The . 
researcher might ask each member to tell who in the group he 
most respects, who he turns to for advice, who provides the 
ideas which seem to lead to action, and so forth. The 
responses to such questions would permit construction of the 
leadership structure. Thus, perhaps, one leader emerges for 
certain issues (matters of public relations) and other leader 
emerges for other issues (matters of internal importance to 
the group). There would be a dual-leadership structure. And 
so forth. 
We simply wish to stress that survey methodologies should 
not be ignored even if the study advances hypotheses about 
the structural properties of groups. Indeed, being indifferent 
to a survey of the members may lead to wrong conclusions if 
it is the case that the formal and visible structural proper-
ties are very different' from the informal and hidden ones. 
4. a) The growth rate of one marketing board and its 
auxilliary staff has been too rapid to allow the 
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working out of effective procedures whereas the pace 
of growth of the other hoard has been more tempered 
and, thus less disruptive. 
b) The distributional patterns are the result of 
deliberate policy choices by the boards, one believing 
that economic growth will be fostered if large 
owners are favored by board policies and the other 
believing that growth as well as welfare considera-
i • 1 . : . • i tions dictate a more equitable distribution of benefits. 
The growth rate of an agency or its policies are what we term 
integral properties of the group. ..Such properties cannot be 
reduced or otherwise decomposed with reference to individual 
attributes of group members. They "belong to" the group and 
only to the group. Consider a few other examples. We refer 
to how old an agency is, that is, the length of time it has 
been in existence. This property of the agency is independent 
of any attributes of its members; it is an integral property. 
The aggregate size of an agency or its budget or the charter 
which brought it into existence are integral properties. 
It is.a common observation about African civil services 
that under Colonial rule they were "systems of control" but 
that since Independence they are being converted into "systems 
of development." Although authors who argue this point are 
not always careful to specify just what they hive in mind, 
it seems fair to infer that they are describing the basic " 
policy orientation which differentiates the civil service 
before and after Independence. Such would be an integral 
property, especially if it is the. result of legislation which 
attaches one or the other general set of obligations to the 
civil service as a whole. Other types of' group properties of 
course would be affected. Thus, for instance, the proportion 
of law enforcement officers to development technicians 
(distributional property), the appropriate conduct when dealing 
with constituencies (relational property), and the command 
hierarchy (structural property) would be affected if basic 
policy changes were made- But the policy to "maintain order" 
or to "develop" would itself be an integral property of the 
civil service. 
Further examples of integral properties are an agency's 
criteria for recruitment and promotion, its development plan, 
its rules for making decisions (for instance, a committee rule 
to be guided by a plurality rather than a majority), or its 
"boundaries" ( as,, when a. development corporation is restricted 
by law to the rural sector). Criteria, plans,.rules, and 
boundaries are things which characterize the group and not 
the individuals in the group, though of course they influence 
individual behavior and relations. 
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For the most part survey techniques are not too useful if 
the research design advances propositions about the integral 
properties of the agencies. In the examples we gave, the 
growth rate of a marketing board would be measured by cal-
culating, from the public record, the percentage increase in 
staff between two chosen points in time; the policy of a 
board would either be observed in their written records or 
deduced from the actual statutes and enactments delivered by 
the board. 
There is an exception, however, which suggests one way 
in which survey techniques might be used even in studying 
integral properties. This exception requires making a dis-
tinction between interviewees as "respondents" and as "infor-
mants." Much as an anthropologist uses a well-placed informant 
to describe village life, a student of administration can use 
a well-placed informant to describe an agency or a bureau. 
That is, the interviewees would not be asked about their 
age but the age of the agency, not be asked about their 
training but about the training program of the agency, not be 
asked their own views but about the policy of the agency, not 
be asked about their recruitment but about the standards of 
recruitment of the agency, and so forth. 
There are dangers to this procedure; not all "informants" 
are equally well informed (or equally open or honest). But 
using more than one informant and cross-checking the information 
can often detect biases and misinformation. Another check is 
to ask an informant a few questions about group properties on 
which reliable independent data are available, and then 
match his information against the independent evidence. • 
Dangers notwithstanding, certain integral properties can 
be identified only with quasi survey methods. Many integral 
properties are not part of the public record, or are difficult 
and expensive to discover. The goals of an agency set forth 
in enacting legislation, for instance, may be a pale (or :even 
misleading) reflection of the operating policies. Reliable 
statistics on the size, wealth, :or growth rate of a bureau may 
not be available. In many instances then, the informant may 
provide better and cheaper data than alternative sources. 
3- a) The absence of a world quota system leads to (temporary) 
inefficiency for one marketing board as it concentrates 
on expanding the nation's share of the international 
market in, this particular crop, 
b) Political pressures deriving from calculations about 
constituency support for.the government in power 
dictate the different patterns of distribution between 
the two boards. 
Very often we set out to explain the performance of administra-
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tive agencies in terms of the larger environment of which they 
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are a part. 'Alien some characteristic of that environment 
is attributed to the agency we say that i.s becomes a contextual 
property. Thus, in the first illustrative example, the two 
marketing boards, differ as regards the international market 
in which they sell their crops. .Whether the crop is governed 
by a world-wide quota system is part of" the economic environ-
ment of the boards and can be used.in analysis, that is to 
explain differences in performance, by converting it into a 
contextual property. The second example turns attention to 
the political environment in order to explain different patterns 
of distribution. The "context" extablished by the political 
links between small farmers and the politicans differs for. the 
two boards, and thus can become a variable, in analysis. 
Contextual properties are c.ommon in development administra-
tion research. The very label "development" implies that the 
administrative apparatus differs depending on whether its 
national environment is that of .an industrialized and "modern" 
society or that of a non-industrial, more traditional society. 
We also refer to contextual properties, when we say that an 
agency is located in the rural sector, that it carries out 
its task in a hostile environment, that it is constrained by 
the prevailing political ideology, or th it it is .affected by 
the society's class structure. 
The following proposition illustrates how a contextual 
property of the Kenya civil service is used in analysis: 
Because of widespread unemployment or underemployment 
and an educational system geared to produce white collar 
workers, there are many more claimants for posts than 
posts themselves. Thus there is political pressure from 
outside the bureaucracy to increase the size of the 
administration. -'And civil servants themselves, at 
least at the top of the. hierarchy, are responsive to 
these demands because their own power is; increased as the size of their ministries increases. 
The rapid' growth rate of the civil service (integral property) 
occurs because unemployment lev Is and the educational curric-
ulum (contextual properties) lead -to political pressure on 
the civil servants (relational property) to which some are 
responsive (distributional property), at least those at the 
top of the civil service hierarchy (structural property). 
Analysis depending on the multiple consideration of various 
types of' group properties is not uncommon, as the reader 
himself can demonstrate by checking any general essay on 
development administration. 
Assigning contextual properties to an administrative unit 
is comparatively straightforward. Survey methods will seldom 
be necessary, though there may be times when an informaiit 
can be used. There are two-things to bear in mind about " 
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contextual;properties. First, it is important not to assume 
that contextual properties have particular effects on the 
operation of•the. administrative groups. The effect is a 
matter for empirical investigation and not a priori assumption. 
To classify marketing, boards with regard to aspects of their 
international markets is the. first step in analysis, not the 
final step. It still remains to be shown whether the absence 
or presence of a quota system is related to performance in 
the manner suggested by the hypothesis. 
Second, what are called contextual properties for the 
lower level unit can be distributive, relational, structural, 
or integral properties of the higher level unit. Consider a 
research design which intended to compare the extension service 
of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture 
in a developing country. The distributional properties (median 
educational, level of all employees), the relational properties 
(patterns of cooperation throughout the ministries), the 
structural properties (lines of authority), and the integral 
properties, (size of the ministry) of the respective ministries 
would all be contextual properties of the sub-unit known as 
the extension service. 
The reader may now hive asked two questions: "Shy all the 
fuss about group properties? Even if we recognize the sig-
nificance of group properties, why all the f.uss about an 
elaborate nomenclature .and classification scheme? 
The answer to the first question is the easier. Groups 
are very often the important units of action in. any administra-
tive system. Indeed, this is true of the -entire political 
system. Courts, review panels, legislative committees, city 
councils, juries, working parties, voluntary associations, 
are just a few .among the ^q ry many collectivities which hive 
powers of government. And we talk about how efficiently such 
groups carry out their tasks and about who benefits and who 
loses because of their decisions. One reason for a fuss about 
group properties then is simply because groups are real units 
of action in political life. Moreover, even if the investigator 
is more interested in the individual administrator or Momber 
of Parliament or trade union leader or political party member, 
very much of what he might wish to understand about the behavior 
of individuals is a result of the groups to which they belong. 
What is known as' the analysis , of structural effects or the 
compositional- hypothesis take as their starting point that 
individual behavior is partially to be explained with reference 
to the distributional, relational, or structural properties 
of his group. 
To' recognize that groups are important units of administra-
tion action in their own right and that characteristics of 
administrative units have a hearing on individual behavior 
does not answer the second question; why all the fuss about 
terminology and classification? This is a fair question, and 
we readily acknowledge that scientific explanation can some-
times be impeded by jargon and hyper-sensitivity to distinctions 
which, in the actual world, are difficult to make. Certainly 
our intent is not to suggest that the student of administration 
should constantly point" out in his writing that this is a 
relational property and this a structural property, etc. 
The most important benefits of a classification such as 
the one suggested here have to do with "research design. 
Decisions about the type of data to collect, about the sampling 
strategy to adopt, and about the form of data collection are 
bound to differ depending on the type of properties identified 
in the research hypotheses. Only a few ramifications of this 
observation can be suggested here, but anyone who has conducted 
research on administrative processes well knows the lament — 
"if only I had asked..,.'". 
If the researcher expects relational properties such as 
cohesion or tension to be relevant to administrative performance 
"hen it is necessary to design a study which permits him to 
locate individuals in terms of the relations they have"with 
other group members. A failure at the design stage will result 
in no measure of "cohesion" or "tension" at the analysis 
stage. Similarly, if he expects that communication patterns 
or authority structures are critical variables, then it is 
necessary to design a study which will produce measures that 
differentiate agencies in terms of such structural variables. 
The following paragraph is taken from an essay by R. J. 
Ouko, Minister of Finance and Administration'for the East 
African Community; it outlines an important proposition relevant 
to development administration. 
The spirit of the civil service is also affected by the 
presence of expatriate officers. Many of these have set 
an example of hard work and devotion to duty and identify 
strongly with the public service, but the tendency of 
some, to operate outside the formal chain • of 'command can 
create difficulties. African officers become frustrated 
when they see the ease with which'some expatriate 
officers get access to top officials in contravention • 
of the established code. This type of administrative 
behavior has a high cost in lower morale among African 
. officers. The advantages gained through such informal 
administrative relationships must always be weighed, 
against their costs in creating administrative tensions 
between expatriates and their African co-equals, thus 05 
impairing the general growth of civil service loyalty. ^ 
At this point in our discussion it is not necessary to point 
out that the elaborate proposition outlined in this paragraph 
depends on assumptions about various types of group.properties. 
It is relevant to und.ersc.ore that this proposition could not 
be tested unless the research design permitted measures of 
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these various properties, and it is our argument that a clear 
identification of the different types of • proper.tie s is a pre-
liminary step to such measurement. The actual wording of 
items in an interview or questionnaire depends oh a clear view 
of what type of property is being measured. The formally 
established channels of communication are a structural property, 
and from a study of these one would learn which levels of 
civil servants.lack the formal right of direct access to, say, 
the Permanent Secretary, To ascertain this structural property, 
one might treat the higher civil servants as informants and 
ask them, "Which positions in this Ministry carry with them 
the right of direct access to the Permanent Secretary?" Then 
taking those levels without such access, one would want to 
know whether expatriates actually do have direct contact with 
the Permanent Secretary and whether this access is greater 
than that of African officers operating at the. same level. 
Access is a relational property. To study it we would ask 
each civil servant, expatriate and African, "Are you ever 
able to communicate about your work directly and personally 
with the Permanent Secretary or do you find it necessary 
always to go through someone else? (If the former) How often 
would you say that you are able to communicate directly and 
personally with the Permanent Secretary?" As a check on. 
this information, the Permanent Secretary might be asked, 
"which members of this Ministry often communicate with you 
personally and directly about their work? In addition, which 
members of this Ministry ever communicate with you personally 
and directly about their work?" By using the structural 
property of formal channels as an indicator of prescribed 
distance from the Permanent Secretary, we next would have 
established whether expatriate and African officers do in-, 
fact tend to be different with respect to the relational 
property of access. From this point, we would then need to 
establish two distributional properties and one more relational 
one. The African officers would be asked "Do you feel that 
expatriates tend to have more direct access to the Permanent 
Secretary than African officers of the same formal rank?" 
and a question probing loyalty such as, "If you were offered 
a slightly better paying job in the private sector, do you 
think you would take it?" Th^se questions would establish 
the distribution of a perception and an attitude among African 
officers. The ether relational property concerns the hypoth-
esis of tension between African and expatriate officers and 
could be investigated by asking, "Are there any particular 
officers in thr'.s Ministry with whom you'find'it difficult or 
unpleasant to "pork?" Here one would be looking for a dis-
proportionate lumber of expatriate nominations on the part 
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of Africans and vice versa. Thus we .see that an identification 
of the type of group property being investigated helps us to 
determine the individuals to whom a question is. to be put, 
whether the' interviewee is to be treated as an .informant 
(when he can be mistaken) or as a respondent (when he cannot), 
and whether interviews are to be treated as single units (dis-
tributional properties) or as pairs (relational properties). 
The utility of the five-part classification of unit 
properties is also seen when we consider sampling strategy. 
This is not the place for a complex - review of sampling in survey 
research, but the previous discussion indicates that differing 
research questions call for different samples. At the outset 
the investigator must decide whether he wishes to sample 
administrators or administrative units, or to draw a multi-
stage sample in which first units are selected and then some 
proportion of members within each unit. .Analysis solely 
concerned with contextual or integral properties might only 
sample administrative agencies. Analysis wishing.to consider 
distributive, relational, and structural properties would have 
to sample individuals within identifiable groups. .Thether the 
total membership would be interviewed, or only a part of the 
membership, would depend on the size, of the group as well as 
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the type of property to be identified. . (Identification of 
most structural and' relational properties in small groups 
requires interviews with all members of the sampled groups.) 
Pairs of individuals could also be sampling units, as.in a 
study which wished to investigate relationships between expatri-
ate technicians and their African counterparts. 
Of course'sampling decisions are made about data other 
than those collected from individuals. A study of communica-
tion structures might sample written messages or telephone 
calls which pass between local, district, and national offices. 
A study of administrative policy might sample directives•or 
enactments. 1 study of administrative- effectiveness might 
sample crop production or numb .r of licenses awarded. But 
whether data are to be collected from' individuals or from 
some form of document, it is .still necessary'to know whether 
the sampling unit is the agency itself. 
IV. 
Earlier we argued.for a focus on productivity in the 
study of African public administration. We would like to 
return to that theme .-now, and discuss the methodology of 
studying organizational 'productivity. We have delayed 
this topic to this point in order to take advantage of the 
typology of group properties which he have now set out. We 
want to suggest that in examining productivity, the student 
of public administration begin by identifying the unit of his 
analysis' and, should this be a collectivity, the types of 
group properties with which he will be working. Further, 
r;iven this frame of reference, we recommend that he look for 
several, partial, reliable indicators of organizational per-
formance which are directly or closely connected with organiza-
tional behavior of the type identified and which can be measured 
easily'enough so as to enable data collection on a large 
number of the units selected. We would like to illustrate 
these points by considering research on agricultural extension 
organizations in ifrica. 
First of all, it is almost impossible to be comprehensive 
in measuring the extent of a government organization's goal 
achievement, This impossibility is not due solely to the 
practical problems of measurement but also to the difficulty 
of ascertaining the exact goals that are being pursued. Most 
government statements of organizational goals have a studied 
vagueness about them. Consider for example the following 
portion of a statement on "Aims of the Extension Service" 
made in a recent Kenya Ministry of Agriculture working party 
report: 
The agricultural extension services should aim to give 
the farmer advice and services which enable him to run . 
his farm and home business more successfully. In its 
orientation, the extension service should cover the 
whole range of farmers from the best to the poorest, 
with the special focus of extension in each District 
left to the discretion of the District Agricultural 
Committee o,. ' 
The central political issue—which types of farms are to 
benefit from agricultural xtension-—is effectively .evaded 
and passed on to another set of committees, which will most . 
likely also avoid it. The end result will probably be a 
continuation of providing the overwhelming bulk of services 
to the larger and more, progiessi ve farmers, who demand them 
and will put them to the most dramatically productive use. 
But it is difficult to be certair. that those who made this 
statement wore aiming at this result. Vagueness In goals 
enables civil servants to deal 'vith demands at the level of 
individual decisions, where contradictory pressures can be 
accommodated more easily. . As Colin leys has pointed out, 
vagueness also gives the organization flexibility and a 
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larger survival.capacity. w IIprecise goals can be adapted 
to new political circumstances nore easily. Similarly, 
clearly specif: ed goals enable precise measurement, which may 
in turn lead to proof of orf.anizabional failure and consequent 
disbandment. r.'hus it is. rarely possible to measure comprehen-
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sively the effectiveness.of a government organization in 
meeting its goals. The most one can-hope to do is to identify 
certain areas which are clearly relevant to assessing part 
of the organization's effectiveness and in which measurement 
is possible. One can then compare the organization with other 
similar ones (or units.of the organization with one another) 
in terms of their relative performance in these areas. We may 
only be able to say, for example, that unit A helps the poor 
more than unit 3 without being certain which is the desired 
or even desirable policy outcome. Explaining the causes of 
difference between the two units is still rewarding. 
Cur experience is that the researcher will generally 
have to settle for several quite- limited and partial measures 
of an organization's effectiveness, Attempts at comprehensive 
measurement are likely to be disappointing to the student of . 
administration and may be completely unfruitful if he has not 
been careful to identify the units of analysis and types of 
group properties he wants to work with. This point can be 
illustrated by, considering two pieces of research on agricul-
tural extension conducted by economists. The first is R. G. 
Saylor's "A Social Cost/Benefit Analysis of Agricultural 
Extension Services in Selected Cotton Growing Areas of Western 
2°) 
Tanzania." At first examination cost/benefit analysis seems 
to offer a rigorous technique for obtaining an overview of 
the efficiency of an organization. One is not likely, however, 
to achieve the precision which the technique appears to promise. 
The various data available to Siylor, for example, were 
reasonably good and probably much better than what can usually 
be expected in developing nations. His task is also relatively 
simple: calculate, all the costs to Government of the project 
and compare them with the increases in cotton income due to 
improvements in yields per acre, But Saylor. is commendably 
honest about the variety of assumptions that could be made 
for this particular analysis (especially with regard to assumed 
increases in yield). Consequently, we are told that there 
are wide parameters on the stream of benefits, wide enough 
for us to consider the project a solid success under the 
optimistic ones and a marginal failure under the pessimistic 
ones. These wide margins of error would be crippling if it 
were important to classify a project or organization only as 
profitable or unprofitable. But wide parameters on the cost/ 
benefit ratio are acceptable as long as we are•examining 
several organizations or projects which have-been analyzed 
under similar assumptions and about waich we are asking, 
"Why have some been more profitable than others?" In other 
words, we can work with error in our estimates when we are 
comparing units and are able to assume that our error does 
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not fundament illy upset tlae rank ordering of these units. 
Thus from the point of. view of the student of administra-
tion lack of precision is not the major problem with cost/ 
benefit analysis. Rather it is that cost/benefit ratios are 
appropriate to study at levels of analysis and with types of 
group properties with which we only seldom want to. work. 
Cost/benefit analysis measures the productivity of a project 
as a whole and thus is gauging, the final impact of all the 
possible influences on the project. In a cotton project, 
for example, these would include peasant responses, soil 
character, international prices, the quality of agricultural 
research, the cotton marketing organization, and the agricultural 
extension organization, not to speak of other government 
bodies that might hive been called upon to participate. If 
one were interested in assessing the productive consequences 
of differences in extension organization, one. would have to 
sort through a large number of other, non-administrative 
causal variables before one got down to the impact .of one's 
unit of interest. Once there, one would be dealing with the 
extension organization as a whole and would be unable to 
probe for differences in productivity within it. .Furthermore, 
the kind of data one had would be largely appropriate, only 
for the study of contextual and integral group properties. 
If one were interested in the study of whole extension projects 
and if one's hypotheses concerned variations, for example, 
in basic extension policies or in ties with other government 
organizations, cost/benefit analysis on a large number of 
extension projects would probably prove quite rewarding. The 
point is, however, that this level of analysis and these 
types of hypotheses are not common in organizational research 
and the student wants to be clear that this is where his 
interest lies. 
The other example, of an attempt to measure productivity 
comprehensively is to be found in the evaluation of Uganda's 
Extension Saturation Project by D wid Vail and E. S. Watts. 
The major part of Vail's research effort went into the collection 
of input and output data on a sample of farms, ultimately 
enabling him to put precise figures on the value of the 
change in output achieved. But .atts and Vail also did a 
less ambitious survey of farmers in four project and four 
control areas and thereby investigated the relative diffusion 
of information and agricultural innovations in these areas. 
From this simpler research they were able to conclude that 
the Project had succeeded in removing the ,.informatiqn 
barriers to agricultural innovation but that other problems, 
such as inadequate distribution of necessary supplies, had 
prevented the desired c h a n g e s . I t is significant that they 
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were able to reach basic judgments about the productivity of 
the project without reference to Vail!s elaborate and precise 
data. (Of course Vail had other intellectual interests that 
made the input-output study valuable to hirru) I't is also 
worth noting that their evaluation is successful because they 
are able to point outside the focus of the Project itself to 
other areas that need attention. Had they wished to make it 
their primary conclusion that the information barrier had not 
been overcome in all project areas (as their data actually 
suggest), the fact that they had only studied the effects of 
four Project extension agents would have made it impossible 
for them to identify the extent of the failures and to analyse 
reliably their causes. The point we are trying to make is 
that a survey of the clients of an organization almost always 
will exhaust one's personal and financial capabilities before 
it has given sufficient data to analyse the nature and causes 
in variation in performance of the organizations (or within 
the organization) being studied. 
Again the issue of the unit of analysis and the type 
of hypothesis is raised. If one wishes analytically to 
treat an organization as a uniform stimulus and to study 
variations in the response of the populace to this stimulus, 
then a client survey is most appropriate. Here one would be 
assuming that variations in organizational productivity are' 
due to differences in its social environment (a contextual 
property) and one's sampling strategy would be directed toward 
getting a statistically adequate number of clients for each 
part of the range in client response. But if one is largely 
interested, as we are in this paper, in the organizational 
causes of variations in productivity, client surveys are 
generally inappropriate, This is not to say that they are 
logically incorrect. One of us once planned to study variations 
in civil servant oroductivity by interviewing a random sample 
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of eight clients for each of a sample of extension agents. 
But note that the real unit of analysis here is the extension 
agent, and clients are only being used to provide an estimate 
of agent effectiveness. In this sampling strategy we would 
have maximized the number of extension agents, even at the 
expense of lowering the reliability of 'our estimate of each's 
performance, because they would have been our unit of analysis. 
So a client survey is a logically feasible method of studying 
organizational productivity, but, as in the immediate example 
cited, it is generally a prohibitively expensive way of making 
such a measurement, and it is likely to direct one's intellec-
tual resources away from the units and hypotheses one set out 
to study. The drive to comprehensive measurement of productivity 
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takes on a life cf its own and forces cut other considerations. 
-.-. Because of the pitfalls of comprehensive measurement 
of productivity, we recommend that one work with- partial 
measures that? are fairly simple to make and which are as close 
to the level and type of organizational behaviour in which 
one is interested as is possible. Precisely because these 
indicators are partial, however, it is important that there 
be several and that they be reliable. Once stated., it is 
obvious.that a factor which improves one aspect of job 
performance may not have the same effect on rnother aspect. 
But practically speaking, the point is often overlooked. We 
can give an example of the d ingers from the-study of the Kenyan 
agricultural extension organization. Two of the performance 
measures used are a test of the extension .worker's technical 
information' and an average of the number of farmers an agent 
saw on days which he devoted to farm visits. The information 
test was developed because it. ;was known that not all extension 
agents are well-informed, .and knowledge oi the agricultural 
innovation, to be.defused is clearly a necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition for good extension work. The farmer 
visits measure was employed as an indicator of how hard the 
extension agent works. Kenyan extension work is primarily 
oriented to individual farmers and not to groups,- but agents 
do have other official tasks to perform and the proportion 
of these to farmer visiting varies between agents. Therefore., 
by asking each agent' to specify the d?.ys on which and the 
farmers which he had visited in the previous- week and by then 
taking a daily average of farmers seen, we felt we were able 
to achieve a measure of work effort that was unbiased between 
different types of work assignments. The first point is that 
these two performance indicators, technical informedness -and 
work effort, are unrelated to one another. The second point 
is that the senority of the extension agent is- related to 
these two indicators in the oppostie directions. Analysis 
which assumed that either of these two indicators alone could 
serve as a surrogate indicator for total performance would 
lead to deceptive results. 
A further problem concerns the choice of relatively 
reliable performance indicators. Two frequently used measures 
which we feel should be used with caution are supervisor 
ratings and morale. This point can be made by referring 
to David Kidd's study of agricultural.extension workers in 
v/e stern Nigeria. Kidd .measured the technical inf ormedness 
and morale of extension workers (knowledge test and job attitude) 
and in addition obtained supervisor and peer evaluationsof 
the same mc-n. Kidd 'himself concludes that, "These findings 
tend to suggest that a man's peer members may be better able 
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Intercorrelations Among Selected. Performance Measures 
of Agricultural Extension workers in Western Nigeria^ 
1. '2. 3. 
1. Knowledge Test X 
2. Peer Evaluation .28" X 
3. Supervisor Evlauation .16 .13 X 
4. Job Attitude =08 .01 X 
5. Rank of Staff (X2) 33o68a 1.92 8.97' (neg)7-77° 
a= statistically significant at the .01 level 
b= statistically significant at the .05 level 
to assess his abilities than his supervisors are. It also 
suggests that his superiors may be more inclined to evaluate 
7.7. 
men according to their job s t a t u s . T h e second point seems 
true more in comparison with peer evaluations than with the 
objective knowledge test when we examine the accompanying 
table. But it is true that supervisor evaluation was the 34 
only performance measure correlated with length•of training. 
Peer evaluations may be biased against rank, for status 
differentials are unpleasant, but supervisor ones are probably 
biased in favour of formal criteria of competence. It is 
therefore undesirable to use supervisor ratings alone in 
evaluating performance, and, if one is forced to do so, the 
analysis should take the probable biases carefully into 
account, R. K. Harrison's study .on Nigerian extension organiza-
tion uses supervisor ratings without attention to their 
problems.^ This greatly limits the usefulness of what could 
otherwise have been a significant study. Another reason for 
not using supervisor ratings is'that they are only valid for 
comparisons within the framework of 'each evaluator. The 
workers or work units of supervisor A cannot be ranked against 
those of supervisor B on the basis of A's and B's internal 
evaluations alone. As we are frequently•most interested in 
precisely such comparisons, supervisor ratings have limited 
usefulness. The issue of the units to be analysed thus is 
raised again here. 
Even more fundamental objections can be raised against 
using morale as an indicator of performance. Morale is - one 
of the important causal factors associated with performance. 
But it does not always correlate with all aspects of performance, 
it 
may relate to other causes of good performance in quite 
different ways than docs performance itself, and its measure 
is subject to severe biases. In the study of the Kenyan 
extension organization, morale was positively correlated with 
only one of the three- objective indicators of performance 
(work effort r=.19, N=54, a controlled subs-ample). In Kidd's 
study in Western Nigeria, the rank of staff was positively 
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correlated with, their knowledge score but negatively related 
to their morale (see the above table). The-same, results were 
obtained in the Kenyan study. Finally, measurements :of morale 
are very easily biased by feelings of insecurity on the part . 
of the respondent, .and such feelings are .usually heightened 
by poor performance. : Thus, in the Kenyan extension organiza-
tion study, when we analysed that part of the sample in which 
workers attempted deceit about their work effort, morale was 
negatively correlated with the objective information test, •. 
and positively correlated with the reported level of work 
effort. Informedness and work effort were negitively- correlated. 
The level of reported work effort is partly a result of 
insecurity.in. a situation,where deception is possible. Thus 
insecurity was created by poor information test performance, 
leading to deception about work effort .and morale and thus 
inflation of these• indicators in these cases. when .insecurity .. 
is instilled in the workers, morale measures are badly 
biased indicators of performance. This point must be stressed 
for good scholars have come close to this error. For example, 
R. G. Saylor administered a work satisfaction Questionnaire 
to Tanzanian extension staff through official channels. He 
then writes, 
Inspection cf the data reveals that the tendency is 
for the older and lower ranking bwana shambas (ex-
tension agents) to have higher mean scores on the 
01 (opinion.index). ...One policy implication which 
might derive from this finding is that more attention 
to age may be profitable both in the initial hiring 
and in retraining schemes, as older workers appear to 
have greater enthusiasm for their work and may be more 
receptive to retraining. ...Finally, the scores of the 
-FA's (the lowest cadre) may suggest against phasing 
this particular cadre of workers out of existence as 
currently planned. 
Such policy recommendations assume a) that the correlates of 
morale probably are positively correlated with performance 
and b) that the measure of morale has not been biased by the 
insecurity induced by an official questionnaire. The Kenyan 
study suggests that the balance of greater performance rests 
with the higher rank Worker, leading to opposite conclusions 
Y7 
to those of Saylor. - ' 
When there is the' possibility of deceiving the investigator 
about the level of performance achieved, we strongly recommend 
validity checks on a sample of the' data. In the study of the 
Kenyan extension organization, staff were asked'to name the 
farmers they had visited in the previous week, as we stated 
earlier. As these lists could be easily inflated by the 
respondent, we took a sample of farmers named by those staff 
who most aroused our suspicion and both checked their existence 
and whether the alleged visit had been made. The checking 
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was not easy, as farmers are ready to impute a variety of 
motives to researcTiers. Gome farmers would deny the incidence 
of an actual visit, believing-that an appearance of neglect 
would be communicated'to Government officers and bring more 
attention in the future;. HVe also hid to- guard against cueing 
farmers, leading them to protect their local extension agent 
against "outsiders." Experience and skilled interviewers 
enabled us to overcome these'oroblems, and We were able to' 
discover'that one interviewer, operating in one 'area, had 
received reliable responses. While the other, working in another 
-two districts, hid been'deceived with some frequency. The 
reliable responses were apparently achieved by the'combination 
of a no-nonsense Interviewer and a reassuring official intro-
duction in' the one district. . e had an accommodating inter-
viewer and poor introductions in the other two. In the latter 
cases, respondents seem both to have felt personally threatened 
at hiving their productivitjf tested by someone who might-be 
from Ministry headquarters and to have been encouraged to 
deception by an unthreatenlng personality. Interviewing in 
a productivity testing situation seems to require very strong 
assurances that the .results are confidential and are not being 
used officially (apparently best from the officials themselves) 
and interviewer cues that he is aware of the possibilities of 
deception and will not be fooled. In any case, tests of 
reliability enable one to know the meaning of one's data. 
Even when mixed reliability is found, interesting analyses 
can be made, as we have done here and above-en the indicator 
of work- effort. 
i.Ve have written a great deal about errors to be avoided. 
It would be well to end this section on the. measurement.of 
productivity with a few- positive suggestions. The first is 
that one become thoroughly familiar :with the, organization 
that one intends to study, with the views of those working 
in it about what are the elements -c-f productive, work, and with . 
the niture of the goods and services produced. Once one has. 
achieved this familiarity some indicators that looked good 
from the outside will be ruled out as inappropriate or complex, 
and others are likely to have been suggested. Most organiza-
tions have some rough ways of .judging their performance,. and 
with .improvement, these methods can frequently.be used. It. 
is probably wise, however, to avoid using precisely the same 
indicators of productivity that .the organization uses for 
rating its members. Once people know that one particular . 
aspect of performance is being used as the basis for promotions, 
they will stress work on that aspect to the detriment of 
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others.^ Thus, although sampling different aspects of 
performance is a good research strategy, the sample will be 
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"biased, if these are the officially observed aspects. Often 
governments collect statistics which could be used to judge 
performance but are not so used themselves or which are resis-
tant to skewed performance. An example of the first would be 
crop statistics, which' show changes in acreages of crops 
planted and of the yields per acre, An example of the second 
might be school examination results or statistics on miles 
of road built or maintained in conjunction with personnel 
employed. One must take care, however, that these statistics 
are accurate, for they often are not. Most of the local 
officials of the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture reported that 
Tetu division near Nyeri*had 100% acceptance of hybrid maize, 
whereas a sample survey of 100 farms showed one-third use of 
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the innovation.'' 
Experience shows that one is generally "wise to go for 
the indicators of performance that are simpler to measure, 
preferably using a sample of them to ease their shortcomings. 
Hursh, Roling and Kerr used quite a simple measure cf extension 
productivity for their study in Eastern Nigeria. They took 
a sample of villages and ascertained how many of a number of 
broadly applicable agricultural programmes were present at 
all in eadh one. As these data were fairly simple to collect, 
they were able to devote most of their research to the char-
acteristics of the villages and extension agents which might 40 
account for differences in adoption rates. One can easily 
think of ways in which this indicator may misrepresent the 
full extent of extension effectiveness. But it is neither 
obviously biased nor so difficult to measure as to have over-
shadowed the rest of their investigation. As a result of their 
clarity of purpose and willingness to simplify, they came 
closer to meeting their theoretical objectives than have many 
of those who have measured the productivity of agricultural 
extension organizations. 
V 
In concluding our essay, we restate our plea for starting 
the quantitative revolution in the field of African public 
administration. The gains to be had in precision, reliability, 
comparability and even new insight are great indeed. If we 
respond to the call for study of productivity made here, we 
can meet the demand of our civil servant counterparts for 
usefulness at the same time that we expand the boundaries of 
our knowledge and theoretical powsr. Ours is not a call for 
an undiscriminating acceptance of survey research. .Ve have 
tried to lead away a'rom some of tie dangers of surveys and 
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to point in the direction of the theoretically challenging 
possibilities of groups as units of analysis. It is very 
possible that the next decade of administrative research in 
Africa will see the wide application of survey techniques to 
the study only of individual administrators. At the end of 
the decade much inform ition will have cumulated about cor-
relations between demographic traits of administrators and 
their attitudes. It is doubtful whether these correlations 
will much advance our knowledge about the performance of 
administrative units or the consequences of their actions for 
the distribution of benefits in society. Per precisely this 
reason we hive attempted to provide some practical notes on 
t'he methodology of studying productivity and administrative 
groups. 



